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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INTOXICATION
Arkansas. An interesting contrast in workmen's compensation
law within different jurisdictions is presented by the recent
supreme court case of Cox Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jones.' In this
case the plaintiff's husband was killed by a freight train while
in the course of employment. The evidence clearly indicated that
plaintiff's husband had been drinking. This was demonstrated
by the testimony of three witnesses, one of whom testified that
she saw the plaintiff's husband approximately five or ten minutes
before the accident and that it was obvious that he had been
drinking. All three witnesses, however, testified that he was not
so drunk that he had lost his self-control. The Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission refused to enter an award, and the supreme
court reversed the Commission's decision on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption against
intoxication causing the death of an employee. Justice McFaddin
wrote a very informative opinion as to the law in Arkansas upon
the question of intoxication as a defense. More particularly he
cited an Arkansas statute2 which says, in effect, that there is a
prima facie presumption in workmen's compensation cases that
the injury did not result from intoxication of the injured em-
ployee. He also cited a statute8 that provides that there shall be
no liability for compensation where the injury was solely occa-
sioned by intoxication of the injured employee. Justice McFaddin
said the effect of these statutes was that the burden of proof was
upon the employer. He must not only prove the employee was
intoxicated but he must go further and prove that the sole proxi.
mate cause of death of the employee was his intoxication. The
employer was held to have failed to sustain this burden in the
instant case.
1 ------ Ark_. , 248 S. W. 2d 91 (1952).
2 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. (1951 Cum. Supp.) § 81-1324.
3 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. (1951 CuM. Supp.) § 81-1305.
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The law and the authorities seem to be altogether to the con-
trary in Texas. Texas' position on this matter is firmly indicated
by the case of Dill v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co." The court set
forth the Texas statute' concerning intoxication, which provides
that an injury sustained in the course of employment shall not
include an injury received while the employee was in a state of
intoxication. The court then proceeded to hold that, since the
wording of the statute is mandatory, the intoxication of the em-
ployee need not be a proximate cause (much less the sole proxi-
mate cause) before it will be a complete defense to an action for
compensation. The jury need only find that the employee was
intoxicated at the time of the injury. In the Dill case there was
substantial evidence to the effect that the intoxication did not
contribute to the employee's injury. In fact, there was a jury
finding that, though the employee was intoxicated, the actual cause
of the accident was the fact that the employee occasioned two
blow-outs on the tires of his truck. However, the court said that
the trial court should have disregarded the finding and rendered
judgment for the compensation carrier upon the finding by the
jury that the employee was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Two later Texas cases, Traders' & General Ins. Co v. Williams'
and Texas Employers' Ins. Assn. v. White,7 reiterated the prin-
ciples in the Dill case and explicitly held that the burden of proof
was upon the claimant to show that the injured employee or
deceased at the time of the injury was acting in the course of
employment and was not intoxicated.
Texas had formerly maintained the position that intoxication of
an employee was not a defense unless it contributed in some way
to the injury, as was illustrated in Employers' Casualty Co. v.
Watson.! There are a great many jurisdictions that require the
4 63 S. W. 2d 1016 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
5 TF.X. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8309, § 1.
6 66 S. W. 2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
7 68 S. W. 2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
8 32 S. W. 2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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intoxication to contribute in some way, and Arkansas is certainly
not by itself in requiring that the intoxication be the sole proxi-
mate cause of the injury, before it will be a defense. An out-
standing treatise says: "In the States of Arkansas, Kansas, Mary-
land, New York, Rhode Island, and the Longshoreman's Harbor
Worker's Act, the employee's intoxication must be the sole cause
of his injuries to bar a recovery of compensation. '
EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY
Oklahoma. Three supreme court cases were decided this past
year which present another interesting inter-jurisdictional compa-
rison. Choctaw County v. Bateman,"0 E. G. Nicholas Const. Co. v.
State Industrial Commission,1 and Bareco Oil Co. v. Allison 2 all
illustrate Oklahoma's position on the necessity of expert medical
testimony to establish the cause and extent of disability from
accidental injury. The three cases were somewhat similar in their
fact situations. In the Choctaw County case the plaintiff injured
his back while shoveling gravel for Choctaw County. At the hear-
ing before the State Industrial Commission a written medical re-
port of the plaintiff's doctor was submitted. The Commission
entered an award for three weeks' temporary total disability and
twenty-five per cent partial disability. The supreme court held
that, though the disability for which plaintiff was seeking compen-
sation was of such character as to require determination of its
nature, cause, and extent by skilled and professional persons,
the written report was sufficient to support the Commissioners'
finding as to the extent and cause of the injury.
Then in the Bareco case, which involved a heart attack on the
part of the plaintiff, and the Nicholas case, which was concerned
with a claim based on a heat stroke suffered by the plaintiff's
0 6 SCHNEIDER'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (Perm. ed. 1948) § 1586.
10 ----Okla -------- 252 P. 2d 465 (1952).
11 ------ Okla -----, 250 P. 2d 221 (1952).
12 ------ Okla ....... 251 P. 2d 1040 (1952).
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deceased, the rule as to expert medical testimony was set forth
in language to the effect that in a proceeding before the Industrial
Commission, if the alleged disability is of such character as to
require skilled and professional men to determine the cause and
extent thereof, the question is one of science and must be proved
by the testimony of skilled professional persons. In the Nicholas
case the evidence indicated that the plaintiff's deceased suffered a
fatal heat stroke while shoveling "chat" or gravel, and the testi-
mony of his fellow employees clearly proved the fact that such heat
stroke occurred in the course of employment. However, the testi-
mony of two doctors only established the fact that the deceased's
death was caused by a heat stroke, and the court vacated the
award so that the Commission could proceed further in the matter.
The reason was that such medical testimony was insufficient in
that some connection between the deceased's employment and in-
jury must be proved. The connection could only be established
by the expert testimony of a doctor. Thus, these cases reveal the
strict requirement of the Oklahoma court in regard to expert
medical testimony. 0
It seems that Texas has adhered to a much more lenient rule.
There are three cases that adequately supply Texas authority on
the subject. In Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Hevolow" the plain-
tiff sustained a broken leg in a fall down a stairway while carry-
ing a heavy drum. The plaintiff testified that this injury extended
to the back, and the jury found that the plaintiff was permanently
and totally disabled. On appeal the defendant complained of
such finding because there was no expert medical testimony sub-
mitted by the plaintiff to substantiate his testimony about his back.
The court of civil appeals said: "The jury may find as to these
matters unaided by expert medical testimony."' 4 In the later case
of Texas Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Jones5 the
plaintiff had also suffered a broken leg. While loading some logs
13 136 S. W. 2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) er. dism. judgm. cor.
14 Id. at 933.
1 195 S. W. 2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. ref. n.r.e.
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on a truck, a log fell on his leg and broke his ankle. The defend-
ant objected to the submission of special issues inquiring whether
the plaintiff had suffered any actual incapacity following his
period of total incapacity on the ground that there was not suf-
ficient evidence to warrant such submission. The plaintiff and his
father both testified in detail about the injury he had received,
but no expert medical testimony was submitted. The jury found
that the plaintiff had suffered partial incapacity for life after his
period of total incapacity. In answer to the defendant's complaint
of such finding on appeal, the court said: "It is true that no medi-
cal expert gave testimony as to his estimate of the nature and
extent of the appellee's injury, but such testimony is not neces-
sary in order that the injured workman may be entitled to a judg-
ment for compensation when sufficient lay testimony has been
received in the case."16 Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Muel-
ler 1 more or less reiterates the Hevolow and the Jones holdings.
The defendant was complaining of a jury verdict awarding the
plaintiff fifty per cent partial disability without the presence of
testimony from a medical doctor, testifying as an expert. The
court again laid down the proposition that no such testimony
was necessary: "It is not, however, necessary to the validity of a
finding of partial disability that there be contained in the record
of the evidence an estimate of an expert medical witness as to
the percentage of disability."'"
ATTORNEY'S FEES
One of the most important cases that has come out in this past
year concerning workmen's compensation is Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Hatton.'9 It appears that the question presented was one
of first impression before the supreme court. Most authorities
would consider this decision surprising, especially in the face of
18 Id. at 812.
17 169 S. W. 2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) er. rel. w. m.
is Id. at 224.
19 -- Tex -.-, 255 S. W. 2d 848 (1953).
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two civil appeal cases, Employers' Liability Assurance Corpora-
tion v. Sims2" and Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Ford,2' which seem to be contra. However, the supreme court pro-
ceeded to distinguish the two cases from the principal case and
adopted the common law rule.
In the Hatton case the plaintiff was seeking compensation for
an injury to his foot. The defendant's attorney asked the trial
court to instruct plaintiff's counsel not to read to the jury that
portion of his petition setting out certain fact allegations con-
cerning a contract which had been made with the plaintiff for a
third of the recovery to be paid as attorney's fees. The court sus-
tained the defendant's motion. But upon a subsequent request by
the defendant's attorney that the court further instruct the plain-
tiff's counsel not to read to the jury a succeeding part of the peti-
tion which repeated facts concerning the contract for attorney's
fees, the court overruled the defendant's motion. The court of
civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the de-
fendant brought error. The supreme court reversed and remanded,
declaring that the trial court had committed error. The reading
of the portion of the petition objected to was reasonably calcu-
lated to create increased sympathy for respondent and to in-
fluence the jury to make a larger award than it would otherwise
make."2 The opinion, written by Justice Culver, distinguished the
case at bar from the Sims and Ford cases. Both of those cases in-
volved an issue of lump-sum award, and such issue was before
the jury for determination. But in the Hatton case the defendant's
attorney had conceded at the beginning of the trial that the evi-
dence would sustain the award of a "lump-sum" recovery; thus,
such issue was not before the jury. In the Sims and Ford cases the
element of attorney's fees was properly to be considered by the
jury on the "lump-sum" issue, whereas in the Hatton case knowl-
edge of the contract for the attorney's fees could serve no such
20 67 S. W. 2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. ref.
21241 S. W. 2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e.
22 255 S. W. 2d at 849.
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purpose but would only hinder the jury in reaching a fair verdict.
The court justified its decision by adopting the common law
rule as set forth in White Cabs v. Moore" and other cases. In the
Moore case the plaintiff was suing the defendant for personal in-
juries received in a collision. The material question was whether
or not the trial court erred in not granting the defendant's motion
for new trial based upon jury misconduct. The jury, in reaching
an answer on the special issue as to the amount of damages, began
speculating as to the amount of the sum recovered by plaintiff
that would have to be paid out in attorney's fees. After "a minute
or two" of such discussion the foreman warned that such consid-
erations were improper. The supreme court reversed and re-
manded the cause, saying that "a jury's discussion, when consid-
ering the amount of the damages to be awarded the plaintiff, of
the attorney's fees that the plaintiff may be required to pay out
of what he recovers is material misconduct and is calculated to
prejudice the rights of the defendant."24 Justice Culver, in apply-
ing this rule in the Hatton case, said that the common law rule
was just as applicable to workmen's compensation cases because
the same calculated influence is brought to bear upon the minds
of the jurors.
The Hatton opinion referred to the rule set forth in Texas Em-
ployers' Insurance Assn. v. Lane25 and other decisions that the
amount of attorney's fees to be allowed in a compensation case
is exclusively for the court and not for the jury. A treatise in
the field of workmen's compensation" concludes that the statutes
in almost all jurisdictions vest in the commission or the court the
power to determine the attorney's fees. Illustrating this state-
ment, 7 New Mexico seems to have adopted precisely the rule in
the Lane case. Robinson v. Mittry Bros."s held that "the matter
23 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W. 2d 200 (1947).
24 Id. at 105, 203 S. W. 2d at 201.
25 124 S. W. 2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) er. dism. judgm. cor.
26 10 SCHNEIDER'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (Penn. ed. 1948) § 2107.
27 Id., § 2146.
28 43 N. M. 357, 94 P. 2d 99 (1939).
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of attorney's fees is a question for the court to determine and
not the jury," but, as is frequently true in other jurisdictions,
the court went on to hold that the jury's knowledge of the amount
of attorney's fees to be paid out of compensation awarded is
harmless and not reversible error. Though the rule remains un-
certain in most jurisdictions, it appears that the question is settled
in Texas as a result of the Hatton decision.
Benton Musselwhite.
